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Abstract 
Knowledge management engages a strong personal dimension that enables a possible success 
or not regarding an organizational knowledge management project. Plus, it engages 
unforeseen ethical and moral dilemmas at an individual level.  
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to link philosophical systems and the knowledge 
management process allowing a comparison between Eastern and Western, regarding the 
ethical and moral dilemmas that arise at an individual level concerning knowledge workers. 
Moreover, we will demonstrate that such challenges are similar, and that Floridi’s information 
theory may provide important answers to that personal dimension of knowledge management. 
 
Introduction 
The quest for obtaining knowledge and perceive its nature is not original. This effort is old as 
the history of human thought. According to Plato, knowledge is justified true belief. In his 
work Protagoras, Plato pleads: “knowledge is the food of the soul” (Jowett, 1899). However, 
other philosophers’ as Descartes or Kant have made also attempts to define it. Todd for 
example, describes knowledge as “human knowing in all its forms … competencies, 
experiences, expertise’s, skills, talents, wisdom, thoughts, ideas, intuitions, commitments, 
innovations, practices and imaginations … the stuff of the human mind. Knowledge resides in 
the user and not in the collection.” (Todd, 2001: 5). For Mattison (2000), knowledge comes 
from experience that we have reflected on, made sense of and tested. Knowledge is a kind of 
sticky residue insight our minds. Therefore, knowledge is gained through experience, and not 
just any (raw) experience. It is usually experience that has been tested, reflected upon and 
judged against other experiences that are also available. It also comes about as a result of 
thinking your way through a problem and what we remember when we first started taking that 
route of though. And finally, Williams (2003) describes the paradoxical “biological” nature of 
knowledge as both a thing and a flow. 
Since its first appearance, knowledge has been described and classified into many forms and 
dimensions of existence depending on the characteristics of knowledge and the aspects 
analyzed. In general knowledge can be divided into two main dimensions: the soft and the 
hard (Kought and Zander, 1992). The hard dimension of knowledge, considered as explicit 
knowledge, exists in the “easy to see and use” forms like information system, documents and 
databases. Such characteristic allows that the hard dimension of knowledge can be transmitted 
from one to another without loss of meaning if the receivers and the senders are both familiar 
with the context of knowledge. The other dimension of knowledge, the soft, knowledge only 
exists in the human minds, in the heads of people or the cognition of humans. This knowledge 
is created when individuals interact with each other and with the environment around them. 
This kind of knowledge is very difficult to clearly define and is something that is 
unconscious. That personal dimension of knowledge is pointed out by Polanyi (1966): we 
know more than we can tell. Therefore, the aim of this research is to debate the unforeseen 
ethical and moral dilemmas regarding personal knowledge management, through out a 
comparison between Eastern and Western philosophical systems. 
As a concluding remark, we acknowledge the arguments concerning the paper structure that 
will allow such debate: the concept of knowledge management; knowledge management and 
ethics; Eastern philosophical systems; the Japanese school; Western philosophical systems; 
the American school; and, finally the philosophical argument. 
 
Development 
Knowledge management 
Managing and enabling knowledge is the key to success in our economy and society, (Harth 
et al, 2005). So, research in knowledge management has gained tremendous pace since its 
inception in the last decade as evidenced by the extensive existing literature and its further 
growth (Ponzi and Koenig, 2002). Much of the literature approaches the discussion how 
knowledge it is transformed and flows through the organization; or whether knowledge relies 
on individuals or the organization; the link between organizational culture and knowledge; 
and, the technological perspective (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Nonaka, 1994). However, the 
current status quo of the knowledge society imposes a discussion considering the ethical and 
moral dilemmas (see for example: Costa and Silva, 2005; 2007). 
Considering that knowledge is fundamentally created by individuals (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995) is crucial to support individuals in their personal knowledge management. According to 
Brelade and Harman (2003) knowledge management is the acquisition and use of resources to 
create an environment in which information is accessible to individuals and in which 
individuals acquire, share and use that information to develop their own knowledge and are 
encouraged and enabled to apply their knowledge for the benefit of the organisation. 
Moreover, knowledge management is a multi-faceted phenomenon and integrates dissimilar 
inter-linked processes (Egbu, Botterill and Bates, 2001). 
In conclusion, the purpose is to create a thriving working and learning environment that 
fosters the continuous creation, aggregation, use and reuse of both personal and organizational 
knowledge in the pursuit of a new business value. Therefore, such realities have been 
approached by the existent schools of thought: Japanese (Nonaka, 1994; 1997; 1998; 2002); 
European (Sveiby, 1997; Roos et al, 1998); and, American (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; 
Nikolaos et al., 2005), in accordance to their cultural and societal environment as Cardoso, 
Gomes and Rebelo (2003) advocate. 
 
Knowledge management and ethics 
The 1996 OECD report on “The Knowledge-based Economy” is an endeavour to establish a 
terminology. In such report is recognized the role of knowledge and technology in economic 
growth; however, the knowledge society encompasses some ethical dilemmas that were firstly 
addressed into the 1999 World Bank report, “World Development Report on Knowledge and 
Development” (World Bank, 1999). The World Bank report distinguishes two types of 
knowledge: knowledge about attributes leading to information problems and knowledge about 
technology, including knowledge gaps. “Typically, developing countries have less of this 
know-how than industrial countries, and the poor have less than the non-poor. These unequal 
distributions across and within countries are called as knowledge gaps (World Bank, 1999). 
However, our research question aims not to debate the societal ethical dilemmas, but the 
individual ones that arise through out the knowledge management process: creation, use and 
sharing by individuals. Knowledge workers produce new information by combining an 
existing body of knowledge (Kidd, 1994). Ideas are formed in the minds of individuals and 
are developed in social interactions (Nonaka, 1994). Therefore, cognitive adequacy is a 
general requirement to balance the personal effort and perceived personal benefit, which 
means individuals need to perceived value into the knowledge process (Ford, 2005), and 
consequently in all its phases: creation, use and sharing. 
Literature acknowledges that trust is based upon commonly shared values and norms, so the 
need for individual transparency is a reality. But how can we define transparency? The word 
“transparent” comes from the Latin word “transparere,” a combination of trans- (“through”) 
and parere (“come in sight, appear”). Relating the etymological foundation of the word 
transparency to our introduction regarding corporate social responsibility illustrates the view 
that transparency is a “state of mind” (Costa, Prior and Rogerson, 2007). Moreover, with the 
advent of ICT transparency becomes mediated transparency, enhancing exponentially the 
ethical challenges, and therefore to obtain such transparency Floridi’s information theory may 
provide important answers. However, what ethical dilemmas arise at an individual level? 
Such dilemmas are: justice and knowledge creation and sharing; justice and fair 
compensation; justice and fair protection and retribution; justice and recognition of human 
dignity and autonomy (see Rawls, 1971). 
 
Justice and knowledge creation and sharing 
Based on contributive justice, it is argued that employees have a moral obligation not only to 
be productive (more specifically regarding the creation of knowledge) in an organization but 
also to share the knowledge that benefits the organization and contribute to the intellectual 
commons. However, personal knowledge may be excluded from manageable knowledge. For 
example, KPMG defines intellectual property as not just patents, trade marks, copyrights, 
database rights and other pure intellectual property, but other forms of articulated knowledge, 
such as business processes, methodologies and know how (KPMG, 2002). At the same time, 
however, contributive justice implies that organizations also have a moral responsibility to 
create an atmosphere were knowledge workers can be productive and have the opportunity to 
not only create, but also share their knowledge and learn from one another. 
 
Justice and fair compensation 
Knowledge creators, as well as, those who share knowledge must be compensated in a fair 
and just manner. However, it does not necessarily imply equal compensation to all. In 
recognizing the principle of merit, justice allows different compensation to different 
individuals. Financial compensation is too limited, and therefore for example Davenport and 
Prusak (1998) suggest some form of official recognition of someone in the company as an 
expert in a certain field. 
 
Justice and fair protection and retribution 
In focusing on the social control of harm to the organization, justice also implies some form 
of retribution and enforcement when it comes to the creation, sharing and using of knowledge 
in an organization. Those who violate the organizations accepted values and the clear 
articulation of what constitutes non-conforming behaviour regarding the creation, sharing and 
utilizing of knowledge should be fairly punished. 
 
Justice and recognition of human dignity and autonomy 
Fundamental to any theory of justice and its application to various situations is the recognition 
of human dignity and autonomy. This normally translates into the recognition and protection 
of human rights. Miller (1999) points out that a central element in any theory of justice will be 
an account of basic rights of citizens. Based on the discussion in this paper the authors 
propose the following five knowledge related human rights: 
• the right to life- as an individual and social right it includes the right to security and 
safety and is specifically applicable to the responsibility of organizations to make 
known information that can harm society (Ryan, 2002); 
• the right to the freedom of expression of ideas- this right correlates with the 
obligations of knowledge workers to create knowledge as well as the duty of 
organizations to create an atmosphere which is conducive to knowledge creation (du 
Plessis, Britz and Davel, 2007); 
• the right of access to those ideas- this right correlates with the responsibility of 
knowledge workers to share their ideas with colleagues. However, the transfer of 
knowledge engages the value dimension personal effort versus benefit as stated by 
Ford (2005); 
• the right to protect and control expressed ideas- this right affirms the right of 
knowledge creators to be fairly compensated for their work, as well as, the obligation 
of organizations to fairly protect their economic moral interests (Blyth, 2005); 
• the right to privacy recognizes the autonomy and dignity of individuals- as an 
individual’s private attribute, organizational programs that aim to forcibly develop 
knowledge-sharing cultures could violate individual privacy rights, and therefore the 
human rights (Rogerson, 1998; Baskerville and Dulipovici, 2006). Plus, the arguments 
proposing or justifying a right to privacy must be taken in account (see Stahl, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the following step of our analysis is to perceive the link between philosophical 
systems and knowledge management: the concept of ba is clearly based on the Eastern 
philosophical systems; the American school engages ICT as a relevant mean to achieve 
knowledge management, which translates a more individualistic perception of life in 
accordance to the Western philosophical systems. 
 
Eastern philosophical systems 
Buddhism 
Buddhist philosophy comprises the essence of Buddha’s teachings, through its four noble 
truths (Gyatso, 1985): truth of suffering; truth of the cause of suffering; the truth of the end of 
suffering; and, the truth of the path that leads to the end of suffering. A simplest explanation 
is: suffering exists; it has a cause; it has an end; and it has a cause to bring about its end. The 
notion of suffering is not intended to convey a negative world view, but rather, a pragmatic 
perspective that deals with the world as it is, and attempts to rectify it. The concept of 
pleasure is not denied, but acknowledged as fleeting. Pursuit of pleasure can only continue 
what is ultimately an unquenchable thirst. The same logic belies an understanding of 
happiness. In the end, only aging, sickness, and death are certain and unavoidable. 
The four noble truths are a contingency plan for mankind deal with the existing suffering- 
suffering of a physical kind, or of a mental nature. The first truth identifies the presence of 
suffering. The second truth, on the other hand, seeks to determine the cause of suffering 
(Harvey, 1990). In Buddhism, desire and ignorance lie at the root of suffering. By desire, 
Buddhists refer to craving pleasure, material goods, and immortality, all of which are wants 
that can never be satisfied. As a result, desiring them can only bring suffering. Ignorance, in 
comparison, relates to not seeing the world as it actually is. Without the capacity for mental 
concentration and insight, the mind is left undeveloped, unable to grasp the true nature of 
things. Vices, such as greed, envy, hatred and anger, derive from this ignorance. 
The third noble truth, the truth of the end of suffering, has dual meaning, suggesting either the 
end of suffering in this life, on earth, or in the spiritual life, through achieving Nirvana 
(Harvey, 1990). When one has achieved Nirvana, which is a transcendent state free from 
suffering and our worldly cycle of birth and rebirth, spiritual enlightenment has been reached. 
The fourth noble truth charts the method for attaining the end of suffering, known to 
Buddhists as the noble eightfold path. The steps of such process are: right understanding; 
right thought; right speech; right action; right livelihood; right effort; right mindfulness; and, 
right concentration. Moreover, there are three themes into which the path is divided: good 
moral conduct (understanding, thought, speech); meditation and mental development (action, 
livelihood, effort), and wisdom or insight (mindfulness and concentration) (Gyatso, 1985). 
 
Confucianism 
Confucius’ views are presented as a coherent and consistent system demonstrating several 
philosophical concerns which do not conflict so much as they complement one another. These 
complimentary sets of concerns can be categorized into four groups (Ames and Rosemont Jr., 
1998): theodicy; harmonious order; moral force; and, self-cultivation. 
Theodicy should be seen as the general framework for understanding of Confucius' 
philosophical concerns. Here arises the concept of tian, which is slightly changed through the 
reading of Confucius’ work. As Graham (1989) noted, Confucius seems to be of two minds 
about tian. Sometimes, he is convinced that enjoys the personal protection and sanction of 
tian; however, in other situations he seems caught in the throes of existential despair. Tian 
seems to participate in functions of “fate” and “nature”, as well as, those of “deity” (Eno, 
1990). What remains consistent throughout Confucius’ discourses on tian is his threefold 
assumption about this extra human, absolute power in the universe: its alignment with moral 
goodness; its dependence on human agents to actualize its will; and the variable, 
unpredictable nature of its associations with mortal actors. 
Regarding harmonious order, the dependence of tian upon human agents to put its will into 
practice helps account for Confucius’ insistence on moral, political, social, and even religious 
activism (Berthrong, 1991). At any rate, much of Confucius’ teaching is directed toward the 
maintenance of three interlocking kinds of order: aesthetic; moral; and, social. 
The instrument for effecting and emulating all three is li (ritual propriety). Labelling it 
“aesthetic” might appear to demean or trivialize it, but to draw this conclusion is to fail to 
reflect on the peculiar way in which many Western thinkers tend to devalue the aesthetic. 
Moral force or de can be characterized as similar to tian, because is heavily freighted with a 
long train of cultural and religious baggage, extending far back into the mists of early Chinese 
history (Fingarette, 1972). De is a quality of the successful ruler, because it rules at the 
pleasure of tian, which for Confucius is resolutely allied with morality, and to which he 
attributes his own inner de. De is therefore the virtue of the successful ruler, without which he 
could not rule at all. Confucius' vision of order unites aesthetic concerns for harmony and 
symmetry (li) with moral force (de) in pursuit of social goals: a well-ordered family; a well-
ordered state; and, a well-ordered world. Such an aesthetic, moral, and social program begins 
at home, with the cultivation of the individual. 
At last, the self-cultivation principle demonstrates two types of persons which are opposed to 
one another- not in terms of basic potential, because Confucius pleads that all human beings 
are alike at birth-, but in terms of developed potential (Munro, 1969). These are the junzi 
(literally, “lord’s son” or “gentleman”), and the xiaoren (“small person”). The junzi is the 
person who always manifests the quality of ren in his person and the displays the quality of yi 
in his actions. The character for ren is composed of two graphic elements, one representing a 
human being and the other representing the number two. Based on this, one often hears that 
ren means “how two people should treat one another” (Boodberg, 1979). Lau (1992), still 
pointed out that ren is an attribute of agents, while yi is an attribute of actions. This helps to 
make clear the conceptual links between li, de, and the junzi. 
 
Japanese school 
Nonaka takes a starting point in a discussion on the epistemological and ontological 
dimension of knowledge. The former dimension refers to the distinction of tacit and explicit 
knowledge whereas the latter dimension, the ontological dimension, which refers to the 
“social interaction between individual that share and develop knowledge” (Nonaka, 1994:15). 
Tacit knowledge is defined as something that cannot be codified, formulated and expressed. 
Explicit knowledge is tangible, clearly stated and can therefore be recorded and stored. 
Polanyi’s perception of tacit knowledge relates to his ideas about the function of knowledge. 
The use of knowledge is expressed in a person’s ability to mobilize it into action or collection 
of new knowledge. However, it is important to note that whilst Nonaka describes knowledge 
as two dichotomies while Polanyi view these as dimensions of knowledge and not as either or 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001). From an ontological point of view Nonaka builds on the belief 
that all knowledge is personal, but such knowledge can be made available and shared with 
others in an organization. In their discussion on how to investigate organizational learning, 
Easterby-Smith et al (2000) make a distinction between macro and micro perspectives: macro 
perspective organizations are viewed as the primary unit of analysis; whereas the micro 
perspective views individuals as the primary unit of analysis. 
Knowledge is further described as context specific, depending on time and space and that 
without context knowledge would only be information. It is argued that “the prime mover in 
the process of organizational knowledge creation is the individual. Individuals accumulate 
tacit knowledge through direct hands-on experience” (Nonaka, 1994: 21). In a later article 
Nonaka (2002) writes that instead of merely solving problems, organizations create and 
define problems, develop and apply new knowledge to solve the problems, and then further 
develop new knowledge through the action of problem solving. The organization is not 
merely an information processing machine, but an entity that creates knowledge through 
action and interaction. It is further argued that micro (individual) and macro (organization/ 
environment) interact and that changes occur at both levels. 
The organizational knowledge creation process model (SECI) consists of four modes of 
knowledge conversion in organizations (Nonaka, 1994): from tacit knowledge to tacit 
knowledge (socialization); from explicit to explicit (combination); from tacit to explicit 
(externalization); from explicit to tacit (internalization). 
Nonaka describes the process as converting new tacit knowledge through shared experiences. 
Externalization aims at articulating tacit knowledge into explicit concepts. In this process 
“knowledge is crystallized, thus allowing it to be shared by others, and it becomes the basis 
for new knowledge.” (Nonaka, 2000: 9). Furthermore, combination aims at combing different 
entities of explicit knowledge, where the process of converting explicit knowledge into more 
complex and systematic sets of explicit knowledge. Finally, internalization aims at 
embodying explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge, which it is described as closely related to 
learning by doing. 
Organizational knowledge creation occurs when all four modes of knowledge creation are 
managed to form a continual cycle or spiral (Nonaka, 1994). In the SECI model the spiral 
illustrates the relationship between these two dimensions of knowledge creation. The 
knowledge creation process is initiated by the enlargement of the individuals’ knowledge 
within the organization where personal subjective knowledge is validated, connected to and 
synthesized with others’ knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Particular and tentative 
knowledge created from an individual’s values and experiences is shared and justified by 
other members of the organization. Experience sharing, the fundamental source of tacit 
knowledge, is fundamental in order to be able to build mutual trust and through a continuous 
dialogue tacit knowledge may be articulated to explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1991). 
Nonaka and Toyama (2003: 2) stress that “knowledge is created in the spiral that goes 
through seemingly antithetical concepts such as order and chaos, micro and macro, part and 
whole, mind and body, tacit and explicit, self and other, deduction and induction, and 
creativity and efficiency. […] the key to understanding the knowledge-creating process is 
dialectic thinking and acting, which transcends and synthesizes such contradictions. Synthesis 
is not compromise. Rather, it is the integration of opposing aspects through a dynamic process 
of dialogue and practice”. So, ba, we can best understand as a shared context in which 
knowledge is shared, created and utilized. The concept originates from a Japanese philosopher 
Kitaro Nishida (1970) and was developed further by Shimizu (1995). Ba further emphasizes 
the importance of context in knowledge creation, because this is the place where information 
is interpreted to become knowledge. Ba provides the vital context where information becomes 
knowledge and where new knowledge is created. It is a recognition that individuals and 
organizations do not operate in a vacuum; they exist in an environment that impacts them. 
 
Western philosophical systems 
Consequentialism 
Consequentialism in his actual usage seems to be used as a family resemblance, with the 
purpose to refer any descendant of classic utilitarianism that remains close enough to its 
ancestor in the important respects. Of course, different philosophers see unlike aspects as the 
important ones. Hence, there is no agreement on which theories count as consequentialist 
under this definition. To resolve this vagueness, we need to determine which of the various 
claims of classic utilitarianism are essential to consequentialism. One claim seems to be 
clearly necessary; any consequentialist theory must accept that certain normative properties 
depend only on its consequences. If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be 
consequentialist. 
It is less clear whether that claim by itself is sufficient to make a theory consequentialist. 
Several philosophers assert that a moral theory should not be classified as consequentialist 
unless it is agent-neutral (Howard-Snyder, 1994; Pettit, 1997). This narrower definition is 
motivated by the fact that many self-styled critics of consequentialism argue against agent-
neutrality. Other philosophers, as for example Bennett (1989), Broome (1991), and Skorupski 
(1995), prefer a broader definition that does not require a moral theory to be agent-neutral in 
order to be consequentialist. 
A definition solely in terms of consequences might seem too broad, because it includes absurd 
theories. Of course, such theories are implausible. Still, it is not implausible to call them 
consequentialist, since they do look only at consequences. The implausibility of one version 
of consequentialism does not make consequentialism implausible in general, since other 
versions of consequentialism still might be plausible. 
 
Kantianism 
Kantianism is strongly based upon the work of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, 
especially his categorical imperative as expressed in his Grundlegungen zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten (1785) as demonstrated by Paton (1964). According to Rossouw (2002) Kant insisted 
that human reasoning and good will are necessary for consistent moral behaviour and he 
defined the good will as “the will that obeys the universal moral law”. From the reading of his 
work, it is possible to acknowledge that he believed that some duties are absolute, and 
therefore distinguished two forms of imperative: the categorical (an instruction to act that is 
not dependent on anything); and, the hypothetical (a conditional instruction to act). 
Kant also believed that people should never be used as a mean to an end, as expressed on its 
Principle of Ends. Rossouw (2002), demonstrates that the German philosopher plead the idea 
that people should act in such a way that, mankind should always be treated as an end and 
never as a mean only. 
 
Aristotelian ethics 
Ethics, according to Aristotle, is an attempt to find out our highest good. Though many ends 
of life are only means to further ends, our aspirations and desires must have some final object 
or pursuit. Such an end is universally called happiness. However, given the fact that human 
nature is based on personal perceptions it is necessary to address such concept. 
Therefore, Aristotle argued that neither the vegetative life nor animals possess the necessary 
biological instruments to a perfect realization and outworking of the true soul and self, 
continued throughout a lifetime. But, he also expands his notion of happiness through an 
analysis of the human soul which structures and animates a living human organism. The parts 
of the soul are divided as follows (The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2006): 
calculative (intellectual virtue); rational (appetitive-moral virtue); and, irrational (vegetative-
nutritional virtue). 
The human soul has an irrational element which is shared with the animals, and a rational 
element which is distinctly human. The ability to properly control these desires is called 
moral virtue, and is the focus of morality. Aristotle notes that there is a purely rational part of 
the soul, the calculative, which is responsible for the human ability to contemplate reason 
logically, and formulate scientific principles. As exposed in the Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (2006), Aristotle's account of moral virtue is his doctrine of the mean. According 
to this doctrine, moral virtues are desire-regulating character traits which are at a mean 
between more extreme character traits (or vices). Moreover, pleasure cannot be identified 
with Good, because appears due a free spontaneous action. In fact, pleasure is a subjective 
concept, because it may vary and be valued in different forms; however, determines 
ultimately the judgment of “a good person”. 
 
American school 
ICT is critical to knowledge management in that they function less to support content delivery 
and more to support problem solving and open-ended tasks (Hanson, 2000; Schneider, 
Synteta and Frété, 2002). Networked ICT enable information access and retrieval, 
communication, collaboration, creativity and innovation. They provide management 
information through daily notices and a calendar, domain knowledge such as units of work 
and legacy data such as student reporting and finance records. The critical component is the 
scope for knowledge creation through connection and interaction. Without this component, 
there is a concentration on explicit knowledge with no recognition of the level and quality of 
interaction. Thus, connectivity through ICT is the difference between a traditional and a 
knowledge-enabled community, being an example the Lindsey model. 
According to Lindsey (2002) knowledge management success has already been explained 
through the Balanced Scorecard approach that Kaplan and Norton (1997) propose. This model 
is a combination of Organizational Capability Perspective theory (Gold, Malhotra and Segars, 
2001) and Contingency Perspective Theory (Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal, 2001). 
The model assesses KM effectiveness using two main factors: Knowledge Infrastructure 
Capability (KIC) and Knowledge Process Capability (KPC), in which the second is 
predisposed by the Knowledge Task. The KPC can be seen as a representation of social 
capital, the relationships between knowledge sources and users, being operationalized through 
technology (the network itself), structure (the relationship), and culture (the context in which 
the knowledge is created and used). In fact, KPC entails the incorporation of knowledge 
management processes at an organizational level, and is operationalized by acquisition (the 
capturing of knowledge), conversion (making captured knowledge available), application 
(degree to which knowledge is useful), and protection (security of the knowledge). Moreover, 
tasks are described as activities performed by organizational units and indicate the type and 
domain regarding the knowledge under use. These guarantee that the right knowledge is being 
captured and used. 
 
Conclusion 
The individual/collective dimensions are actually a syndrome of knowledge management, but 
engage a considerable number of cultural differences. In fact, the cultural syndrome is “a 
pattern characterized by shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles, and values that are organized 
around a theme and that can be found in certain geographic regions during a particular historic 
period” (Triandis et al., 1995: 43), which is demonstrated through out the relationship of 
philosophical systems and the knowledge management models of Eastern and Western 
societies. 
In collectivist cultures, people are more likely to define themselves in terms of group 
membership and place great value on its welfare. People are more likely to perceive 
negatively business practices that are inconsistent with the welfare of the collective (Erez and 
Earley, 1993). In contrast, in individualist cultures, people are more likely to perceive 
themselves as autonomous and place a higher value on their individual interests. So while 
duty, hierarchy, and interdependency are at the crux of what is moral in collectivist cultures; 
harm and rights form the basis of an individualistic moral domain (Shweder, 1990). For that, 
we may claim that in spite of the existence of similar ethical and moral dilemmas at an 
individual level, the perception of such dilemmas is entirely different. Plus, ethical dilemmas 
such as privacy regarding individual knowledge may be not perceived as such in eastern 
societies, as plead by Orito and Murata (2005, 2007). 
However, the dichotomist dimension, individual/collective, imposes the need for transparent 
behaviours (Costa, Prior and Rogerson, 2007). However, with the advent of ICT transparency 
becomes mediated transparency, enhancing exponentially the ethical challenges, as stated by 
Floridi (2006); and therefore, a new model is needed (see Costa, Prior and Rogerson, 2007). 
Given such reality, Floridi’s information theory (2004; 2006) may provide important answers 
to that personal dimension of knowledge management, through two levels of justification: the 
characteristics of such theory; and, how information and communication technologies 
empower people individually. 
The name information ethics is appropriate to Floridi’s theory, because it treats everything 
that exists as “informational” objects or processes. In fact, all entities will be described as 
clusters of data, that is, as information objects. More precisely, any existing entity will be a 
discrete, self-contained, encapsulated package containing because: 
• the appropriate data structures- which constitute the nature of the entity in question, 
that is, the state of the object, its unique identity and its attributes; 
• a collection of operations, functions, or procedures- which are activated by various 
interactions or stimuli (that is, messages received from other objects or changes within 
itself) and correspondingly define how the object behaves or reacts to them. 
 
At this level of abstraction, informational systems as such, rather than just living systems in 
general, are raised to the role of agents and patients of any action, with environmental 
processes, changes and interactions equally described informationally (Floridi, 2006), which 
describes perfectly the role of the knowledge worker and the ethical and moral dilemmas 
stated. 
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